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JOSEPH LITTLE,* ROBERT P. BERRENS* & PATRICIA
A. CHAMP*

Uncharted Territory-The Charter
Forest Experiment on the Valles
Caldera National Preserve: An Initial
Economic and Policy Analysis****
ABSTRACT
The Valles Caldera National Preserve (VCNP), located in
Northern New Mexico, was the first federal land acquisition
specifically devoted to the applicationof the charterforest concept.
Managed by a nine-member trust board, the VCNP represents a
unique public lands management experiment. The objective of
this article is to provide an initial economic, institutional, and
policy analysis of the recreation program on the Preserve. Given
its early prominence in program development, an analysis of the
elk-hunt program is used to provide insights into how the Valles
Caldera Trust has attempted to balance revenue generation and
equity considerations while dealing with external pressures
introduced by the state and private interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tucked away in the 2003 Budget Report of the President is a
general proposal for legislative action to establish pilot charter programs
1
on the nation's public lands. The simplest definition of a charter forest is
.
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1. Quoted directly, "To overcome inertia and an excessive decision-making structure,
USDA will develop legislation in 2003 to establish 'charter forests.' This proposal would
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a public land unit that operates outside of existing federal land
management agencies and has in place some type of alternative funding
mechanism (e.g., net-income financing). The proposal has generated
considerable debate and many do not yet fully understand the concept
or how it will be applied. However, a charter forest experiment is
already underway in northern New Mexico. The 89,000-acre Valles
Caldera National Preserve (VCNP), established on July 25, 2000,
represents the first federal land acquisition to create a charter forest.
Management of the VCNP is in the charge of a nine-member
trust board comprised of individuals representing federal, state, and
local interests. The Valles Caldera Trust (VCT or the Trust) has a
mandate to maintain the VCNP as a working ranch, protect the public
interest, provide for sustainable use, and strive for financial selfsufficiency. 2 As a unique public land management experiment, the
VCNP merits close scrutiny by land managers, policy makers, and
researchers. 3 The objective of this article is to provide an economic,
institutional, and policy analysis of the recreation program at VCNP,
with particular attention to initial efforts at revenue generation, public
access, and program design.
This article is divided into five sections including the
introduction. The second section discusses the conceptual roots and
establish certain forests or portions of forests as separate entities, outside the Forest Service
structure, that report to a local trust entity for oversight." BUDGET REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 65, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
usbudget/fy03/browse.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2005). It would seem that the administration's statement applies to the nation's public lands in general since it does not directly
mention programs already in existence, such as the Presidio Trust in San Francisco and the
Valles Caldera National Preserve in New Mexico.
2. Valles Caldera Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 698v-1 to v-6 (2000).
3. Economists have provided significant input in philosophical debates over public
lands management, but that input should not be seen as emanating from a single
philosophical perspective. For positions supporting the privatization of significant portions
of the public domain, see B. Delworth Gardner, Privatizing the Public Lands, Focus ON
UTAH, SUTHERLAND INSTITUTE (1996), at http://www.sutherlandinstitute.org/ Publications
/FocusonUtah/PublicLands/PublicLands.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2005); Terry L.
Anderson et al., How and Why to Privatize Federal Lands, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS No. 363, 1,
1-25 (Dec. 1999), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-363es.htm (last visited
Mar. 17, 2005). For alternative positions, see Daniel Bromley, Public and Private Interests in
the Federal Lands: Towards Conciliation in the Public Lands and U.S. Economy, PUBLIC LAND

AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: BALANCING CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (George
M.
Johnston & Peter M. Emerson eds., 1984); JOHN B. LOOMIS, INTEGRATED PUBLIC
LANDS
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS TO NATIONAL FORESTS, PARKS,
WILDLIFE

REFUGES, AND BLM LANDS 88-108 (1993). For a general review of alternative schools of
thought in resource and environmental economics, see Alan Randall, Methodology, Ideology,
and the Economics of Policy: Why Resource Economists Disagree, 67 AMER. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1022,
1022-38 (1985).
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characteristics common to charter proposals, focusing on the trust model
as applied to the VCNP. The third section of the article presents an
overview of the institutional structure and policy goals of the VCT.
Legislative mandates place the VCT in the position of having to balance
protection of ecological integrity with considerations of equitable public
access and financial sustainability. These considerations also must be
balanced in the context of state, local, and private interests that each
holds a stake in how the VCNP evolves. There are a wide variety of
public access and outdoor recreation opportunities that the Trust is
considering through initial program development. In the fourth section
of the article, we analyze the VCNP elk-hunt program. Given its early
prominence as a source of revenue generation, the Trust has attempted
to use the elk-hunt program to balance equity concerns with revenue
generation goals. The final section provides closing discussion and
conclusions.
II. CHARTER FORESTS: CONFLICTING IDEALS AND AN
UNEXPECTED CONSENSUS
The expanse of federal public lands spread across the American
West has long fueled a philosophical debate between advocates for
centralized public management and control and advocates for states'
rights and private property interests. There are also calls for seeking out
alternative institutional arrangements that would change the way
4
natural environments are managed. Against this backdrop, the charter
forest concept represents a kind of middle ground or blending of policy
ideas-retaining public ownership and public interest considerations
5
while significantly increasing local or regional control. Often, charter
forest proposals contain explicit considerations for financial indepen-

4. See DANIEL KEMMIS, THIS SOVEREIGN LAND: A NEW VISION FOR GOVERNING THE
WEST (2001); John A. Baden & Pete Geddes, Reform, Don't Privatize National Forests,
BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON., July 3, 2002, available at http://www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.

php?id=20 (last visited Mar. 18, 2005). For further discussion, see Matt Jenkins, Can Charter
Forests Remake an Agency?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 18, 2002, available at http://www.
hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article id=11081 (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
5. The charter forest concept has evolved over time. For early work on the subject, see
Richard L. Stroup & John Baden, Endowment Areas: A Clearing in the Policy Wilderness?, 2
CATO J. 691, 693 (1982). See also John A. Baden, Park Problems? Try Trusts, BOZEMAN DAILY
= 361
CHRON., Sept. 10, 2003, available at http://www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id
(last visited Mar. 17, 2005); John A. Baden & Robert Ethier, A Way to Encourage
Environmental Entrepreneurship,SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, availableat http://www.free6
eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id=31 (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
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dence or management of programs out of net receipts or net income. 6
While stopping considerably short of privatization, the inclusion of a netincome financing requirement within charter proposals is an attempt to
reduce the disincentives associated with reliance on congressional
appropriations. 7 Although charter forests display a number of
characteristics uncommon to more traditional public land management
structures, financial independence perhaps best distinguishes the
8
concept.
Most of the criticisms directed at the charter forest concept are
related to traditional public interest and national heritage arguments
supporting continued public ownership of the nation's lands. Critics see
a direct linkage to a devolution agenda, which stresses transfer of control
to local authorities or, in the extreme, outright privatization of the public
lands. 9 Charter forests are viewed as potentially undercutting
democratic principles by transferring control from the federal
government to local interests. Given that most of the proposed charters
are for lands in the West where historical resource extraction interests
are strongest, critics argue that handing control over to local interests is
tantamount to giving the lands to miners, loggers, and ranchers. Critics
6. Financial independence refers to net-income financing rather than federal
subsidization and support through general tax revenues. See Community-Based Land
Management and Charter Forests: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Forests and Forest
Health of the House Comm. on Resources, 107th Cong. 11-18 (2002) (statement of Jay
O'Laughlin, Professor of Forestry, University of Idaho). Arguments for reforming federal
public land management to require that programs be run off their net-receipts have a long
history. See, e.g., RANDAL O'TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE 6-8 (1988). In the case

of the VCNP, the VCT is allowed to request federal appropriations to help fund operations.
Valles Caldera Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 698v-2 (2000). It is expected that the Trust will
take programmatic steps to gradually reduce the VCNP dependence on federal support.
See VALLES CALDERA TRUST, VALLES CALDERA NATIONAL PRESERVE, DRAFT FRAMEWORK
AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT 53-58 (2004).

7. For example, one criticism of current U.S. Forest Service funding practices is that
publicly subsidized timber sales create a perverse incentive to expand the scope of such
projects, further harming the environment. Randal O'Toole, Charter Forests Offer Public
Lands Solution, CASCADE POL'Y INST., Spring 2002, available at http://www.cascade
policy.org/.. %5Cpdf%5Cenv %/5Ccharter-forests.html.
8. See Terry L. Anderson & Holly Lippke Fretwell, A Trust for Grand StaircaseEscalante, POL. ECON. RES. CTR. 1, 7 (1999); Stroup & Baden, supra note 5, at 705-08.
9. See Michael McCloskey, Charter Forests and the Devolution Agenda, OKLA. SIERRA
CLUB, July 2002, available at http://oklahoma.sierraclub.org/greencountry/Pages/charter
%20forest.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2005); Lisa Shelton, What's Going on in the Forest?
Critics Take on Bush's Healthy Forest Initiative, RAVEN REV., Nov. 1, 2002, available at http://
www.raven.prescott.edu/features/forest.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2005); Greg Lakes,
Charter Forest Proposal Is All Talk, but That's a Significant Start, HEADWATERS NEWS, Mar. 27,
2002, available at http://www.headwatersnews.org/ /p.032702.analysis.printer.htm (last
visited Mar. 17, 2005).

Winter 20051

UNCHARTED TERRITORY

highlight that most, if not all, charter proposals contain provisions to
streamline legal and administrative appeals processes, which reduces
oversight. 10 Streamlining also diminishes the recourse that citizens have
to appeal potentially harmful land management practices." Another
argument against the charter forest model is that the alternative funding
mechanisms typically included in charter proposals provide incentives
to generate revenue by further degrading the public lands as managers
12
focus on extractive or consumptive marketable commodities. Other
alternative sources of revenue, such as rationed recreational access,
require more than just minimal fees. Such fees, it is argued, are viewed
a
as a form of double taxation that would prohibit many from enjoying
13
access.
inequitable
promote
national birthright and would potentially
Fundamentally, the arguments for devolution are based upon a
long-held feeling that the federal government has usurped the primacy
of local interests who depend upon the public lands for a living. That the
economic linkages between rural western economies and the nation's
public lands have changed over time has only exacerbated these
feelings. 14 The "sagebrush rebellion" and "wise use" movements
represent the magnitude of this ill will. 15
10. McCloskey, supra note 9. Proponents suggest that process streamlining is a
necessary step that must be taken if "Analysis Paralysis" is to be broken. See CommunityBased Land Management and Charter Forests:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Forests and Forest
Health of the House Comm. on Resources, supra note 6, at 11, 12.
11. Jenkins, supra note 4.
12. Bill Willers, Charter Forests: Privatizing the Public Domain, BUS. J. MILWAUKEE, Apr.
15, 2002), available at http://milwaukee.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2002/04/15/
editorial4.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
13. The debate over recreational fees on public lands is much broader than
applications to charter forests. Congress initiated the "Rec Fee Demo" program on federal
lands in 1996 and extended it several times; it has also been the subject of heated debate.
ENVTL. NEWS
For a synopsis, see Bob Berwyn, Battle Royal Brewing over Rec Fee Program,
44 1
NETWORK, Mar. 10, 2001, at http://www.enn.com/arch.html?id= 3 (last visited Mar. 17,
2005). For more detailed policy discussion and references, see John Loomis, The Role of
Economics in Managing Natural Resources for Society, in SOCIETY AND NATURAL RESOURCES: A
SUMMARY OF KNOWLEDGE 295, 296 (Michael J. Manfredo et al. eds., 2004); Jerrell Ross
Richer & Neal A. Christensen, Appropriate Fees for Wilderness Day Use: Pricing Decision for
Recreation on Public Land, 31 J. LEISURE REs. 269, 269-80 (1999); Robert K. Davis et al., Role of
Access Fees in Managing Wildlife Habitat on the Federal Lands, TRANSACTIONS 52ND N.A.
WILDLIFE AND NAT. RESOURCES CONF. 544, 544-51 (1987); Annette Puttkammer, Recreation

Fees in Wilderness and Other Public Lands: An Annotated Reading List, in LINKING WILDERNESS
RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT-VOL. 3 (Vita Wright ed., 2001) (GTR RMRS-GTR-79-VOL3,
RMRS, Ft. Collins, CO).
14. Over the last several decades, structural economic adjustment has significantly
changed the nature and composition of regional economies in the Rocky Mountain West.
For example, many traditional natural resource extraction activities have declined
significantly in relative importance, while the relative importance of tourism and service
sectors has increased, including many high skill, technical service jobs. Many who have
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Proponents of the charter forest concept argue that most, if not
all, of the problems of the public lands are due to the attenuation of
private property rights. 16 The continued subsidization of logging,
mining, and grazing has seriously eroded the health of the public
lands. 17 It is argued that social costs can be largely internalized with a
clear definition of property rights.' 8 The continued government
ownership of land impedes this process and prevents individuals from
bearing the cost of poor decision making.19 The weak link in the
argument is that true public goods (e.g., protection of biodiversity and
wilderness preservation) are non-rival and non-exclusive and will be
underprovided by markets due to free-riding behavior. 20
In the general case, the extent to which the charter forest concept
embodies a devolution/privatization agenda is debatable. Provisions to
protect the public interest are included within charter proposals. 21

seen traditional employment disappear and be replaced by what are perceived to be
inferior service jobs commonly misunderstand this adjustment. Also not fully understood
is the crucial role that environmental amenities play in attracting jobs, in-migrants
(including retirees), and revenues to Western economies. See THOMAS MICHAEL POWER &
RICHARD N.

BARRETT, POST-COWBOY

ECONOMICS: PAY AND PROSPERITY IN THE NEW

AMERICAN WEST 51-68 (2001). By way of example, in 2003, natural resource extraction
employment in New Mexico fell by 11 percent, while retail trade and service (including
tourism) employment was expected to increase by 1.7 and 2.5 percent, respectively.
Currently, recreation and tourism rank fifth in terms of employment, behind government,
retail trade, professional services, and health care. LAWRENCE A. WALDMAN, THE NEW
MEXICO ECONOMY 1, 5-6 (2004), at http://www.edd.state.nm.us/FASTDATA/unm
overvieweconomy.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
15. The "sagebrush rebellion" is the antecedent of the "wise use" movement; both
stress the need to transfer control of the public lands to local hands. An excellent summary
discussion is found in Loomis, supra note 3, at 107-08.
16. Proponents of privatization are also called free market environmentalists. TERRY L.
ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 4 (1991).
17. Stroup & Baden, supra note 5, at 691-93.
18. Gardner, supra note 3.
19. Id.
20. Public goods can be the source of both use and non-use (e.g., existence values).
Over the last several decades, economists have developed a battery of techniques for
assessing the non-market values, willingness to pay or accept compensation, for changes in
environmental public goods. These approaches include a variety of both stated preference
(e.g., the survey-based, contingent valuation method) and revealed preference methods
(e.g., the travel cost method). For a review, see A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION
(Patricia A. Champ et al. eds., 2003). For discussion and examples of the application of nonmarket valuation approaches to public lands, see LOOMIS, supra note 3, at 156-59; RANDALL
S. ROSENBERGER & JOHN B. LOOMIS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., BENEFIT TRANSFER OF OUTDOOR
RECREATION USE VALUES: A TECHNICAL DOCUMENT SUPPORTING THE FOREST SERVICE
STRATEGIC PLAN (2000 REVISION) (2001).

21. Community-Based Land Management and Charter Forests: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Forests and ForestHealth of the House Comm. on Resources, supra note 6. The VCPA contains
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Ideally, charter proposals provide for the public interest, allow for
increased local input, and remove the economic disincentives associated
with public subsidization. In the specific case of the VCNP, land
ownership changed from private to public, rather than the other way
around.
Given that the VCNP is managed by a fully independent Trust,
the following discussion focuses on the trust model. Public trusts have
played a role in land management at the state level for a long time. In the
traditional sense, a trust is an entity charged with managing a resource
2
for the benefit of a designated party.2 In this case, a trust represents a
land management body that bears responsibility to care for and preserve
23
the well being of a specified parcel of land for the benefit of the public.
Given the risk and uncertainty associated with inter-temporal allocation,
there is an incentive for trusts to take more conservative actions than
24
otherwise would be pursued by the individual.
Trusts have been used on numerous occasions to manage a
portfolio of natural resources, so a precedent does exist. State
endowment lands are a ready example of how the principles of trust
25
Private
doctrine have been applied to public land management.
organizations also use trust doctrine to promote sustainable land
management. 26 Besides the VCT, two other independent trusts have been
given the responsibility to manage federal land. The Presidio Trust was
established in 1996 to manage the Presidio military reservation, which is
27
now a part of Golden Gate National Recreation Area. The Oklahoma
various provisions requiring the Trust to guard the public interest. Valles Caldera
Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 698v-1 to v-10 (2000).
22. Antony Scott, Trust Law, Sustainability, and Responsible Action, 31 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 139, 13940 (1999).
23. Id.
24. This is because trusts do not maximize expected utility. Id. at 14549.
25. JON A. SOUDER & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS: HISTORY, MANAGEMENT,
AND SUSTAINABLE USE 33-36 (1996).

26. The National Audubon Society and Rainey Wildlife Sanctuary are two examples of
private organizations that have used trusts to manage sensitive ecosystems. Anderson &
Fretwell, supra note 8, at 8-9.
27. The Presidio Trust is made up of seven individuals: six are appointed by the
President of the United States; the seventh is either the Secretary of the Interior or his/her
designee. The trust is responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the buildings and
open space contained within the reservation. Operational funds are obtained by leasing
space to public and private interests. THE PRESIDIO TRUST, at http://www.presidio.gov/
TrustManagement (last visited Mar. 17, 2005). The Oklahoma City Memorial Trust
descends from the Oklahoma City Volunteer Task force that built the management
framework for the Oklahoma City National Memorial. OKLAHOMA CITY NATIONAL
MEMORIAL HISTORY, at http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/hist-deta.htm?id

=2693480 (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
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City National Memorial Trust was created in 1997 to manage the
memorial that sits at the site of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
bombing. While both these bodies are sometimes cited as examples of
the charter concept, they differ from the VCNP in their urban locale and
pre-existing inclusion in the federal domain.
It is argued that trusts can be structured to account for local
interests and to flexibly manage financial resources. 28 Local input into
the decision-making process is achieved by giving a seat to local interests
on the trust board. Financial self-sufficiency requires the trust to fund
operations out of net-income, forcing board members to account for the
costs of management decisions and removing negative incentives
brought about from reliance on subsidization. 29 In theory, the public
interest is protected by clearly defining the institutional relationship
between the trust and the beneficiary. 30 Well-defined policy objectives
provide the foundation of this relationship. Such objectives would
include the preservation and conservation of natural resources and
environmental amenities, the provision of fair and equitable public
access, and the protection of cultural and historical sites. The operational
latitude granted in the chartering document binds actions taken by the
trust to meet such objectives. 31 Although charter proposals typically
contain provisions exempting the managing body from portions of the
legal and administrative appeals process, they are still required to satisfy
federal environmental and land-management legislation.32 Process
transparency (e.g., open meeting requirements and public comment
periods) provides another level of public accountability.
The charter forest concept continues to evolve. The VCNP is a
test of the provisions typically contained within charter proposals. For
the concept to mature, policy makers, researchers, and land mangers
must be able to draw on the lessons that are to be learned from the
VCNP.
III. THE VALLES CALDERA NATIONAL PRESERVE: AN
EXPERIMENT
Located in the Jemez Mountains of Northern New Mexico, the
VCNP spans approximately 89,000 acres and is defined by its unique
28. Anderson & Fretwell, supra note 8, at 7.
29. Id. at 18-22.
30. Scott, supranote 22, at 40.
31. Stroup & Baden, supra note 5, at 705-08.
32. See Community-Based Land Management and Charter Forests: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Forestsand ForestHealth of the House Comm. on Resources, supra note 6 at 13.
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topography (the largest sunken volcano in North America) and relatively
pristine landscape. Within its boundaries exist extensive wildlife,
including a large elk herd (variously estimated at between 4000 and
6500), the headwaters of the Jemez River and San Antonio Creek, timber
reserves, a high-elevation grassland, and a number of cultural and
archeological sites. Also known as the Baca Ranch, the lands
encompassed by VCNP boundaries have a long history of use by tribes,
33
settlers, hunters, and ranchers for a variety of purposes. Along with
consumptive values, non-consumptive values associated with the
cultural, historical, scientific, ecological, and recreational characteristics
34
add to the distinctiveness of the site.
For decades the federal government has viewed the area as a
potentially valuable addition to the public domain. New Mexico Senator
Clinton Anderson (D-N.M.) attempted to broker a deal to transfer the
35
Valles Caldera to the federal government in the 1960s. In 1975, the
National Park Service designated the Baca Ranch as a National Natural
Landmark.3 6 Between 1978 and 1980, federal efforts to acquire the Valles
Caldera were renewed as the owner, the Forest Service (USFS), the Fish
and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and the National Park Service (NPS)
ownership. 37
to public
the property
transferring
discussed
Unfortunately, the owner passed away before any sale could be
by Congress to purchase the tract were
finalized. Renewed efforts
38
initiated in the mid-1990s.
The negotiations that led to the final deal were contentious and
time consuming. A primary issue in completing the public acquisition of
the Valles Caldera was negotiating an acceptable sale price. A review
assessment by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) conflicted with
the findings of both an independent appraisal conducted by Van Court
39
and Company and a later review opinion by the USFS. At issue was the
$101 million price that had been settled on by the private owner and the
federal government. The GAO review assessment placed the fair market
value of the Valles Caldera at roughly $37 million less than the $101

33. VALLES CALDERA TRUST, supra note 6, at 39-40.
34. Id.
35. Karen MacPherson, Bingaman Takes up a Cause Started by Clinton Anderson,
ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Sept. 24,1997.
36.

VALLES CALDERA TRUST, supranote 6, at 42.

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Oversight on the Baca Ranch Appraisal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Forests and
Public Land Management of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 106th Cong.
(2000) (statement of Jack Craven, Director of Lands, Forest Service).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

million sale price. 40 Van Court and Company and the USFS contended
that the appraisal procedures used by the GAO failed to account for the
distinctive natural characteristics that made the Valles Caldera the
"Yellowstone of the Southwest." Both the independent appraisal firm
and the USFS found "that the highest and best use [of the Baca Ranch]
would be its existing multi-use regime for ranching, private
accommodation and outfitting (a "trophy ranch")." 41 The magnitude of
this exclusion was only increased by the failure of GAO auditors to
actually visit the area during the appraisal process. 42 To various
supporters, the private appraisal firm, and the USFS review, the $101
million price tag represented a premium on an extremely unique
landscape and high mountain trophy ranch. 43 Congressional
appropriations for the purchase in 2000 came from the Land and Water
Conservation Fund (LWCF).44
In addition to the issue of the sale price, questions pertaining to
management also had to be resolved. Senator Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)
was reluctant to expand the federal domain in the State of New Mexico
without some significant management reforms. 45 The consensus
resolution that was reached became the defining institutional
characteristic of the VCNP: it would be managed by an independent
trust rather than the USFS. The operational latitude and primary
objectives of the VCT were set out in the Valles Caldera Preservation Act
(VCPA) that was passed by the 106th Congress and signed by President

40. GOV'T ACCT. OFF., FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT:
RELATED TO THE BACA RANCH APPRAISAL 35 (Mar. 2000).

LAND ACQUISITION ISSUES

41. See Oversight on the Baca Ranch Appraisal:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Forests and
Public Land Management of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, supra note 39.
In terms of comparable ranch sales, the private appraisal (Van Court and Company) and
the USFS review emphasized a more select set of transactions (16 recent sales in the Rocky
Mountain West, with 2 direct comparisons to large, high mountain, trophy ranches)
relative to the broader set (and lower mean per acre values) discussed by the GAO report.
42. Id.
43. Jessica Wehrman, Baca Ranch Worth Its Price, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 11, 2000.
44. Codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 46014604 (2000), the LWCF is used for the federal
acquisition of parks and recreational lands, to provide matching grants to states for
recreation planning, acquisition, and development. Funding for the LWCF comes from the
sale of surplus federal property, motorboat fuel taxes, recreation fees, and royalties from
offshore gas and oil leases. Section 4 601-4606a of the LWCF also contains provisions stating
that federal land administrators can levy access fees for the purpose of resource protection.
The use of the LWCF to purchase the VCNP, and the subsequent implementation of a fee
structure on the preserve, is consistent with these provisions and the stated purposes of the
fund itself-to provide recreational opportunities for the American public.
45. Robyn Morrison, Baca Ranch Buy-Out Has Strings Attached, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
May 8, 2000, at 5.
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Clinton on July 25, 2000.46 Federal acquisition of the Baca Ranch brought
and introduced a new
to close a long history of private ownership
47
management.
land
public
in
experiment
The VCNP is the first federal land acquisition specifically
purchased for the purpose of experimenting with the charter forest
concept. The VCT is a nine-member board comprised of individuals
representing a variety of interests. Two permanent members represent
the USFS and the NPS; the seven remaining represent local and state
interests. 48 Of the seven non-federal representatives, five must be current
49
residents of the state of New Mexico. Each board member is required to
have expertise in one of seven areas: (1) livestock management, (2)
(4) non-profit
(3) sustainable forestry
wildlife management,
and history,
culture
regional
(6)
management,
financial
(5)
conservation,
50
does not
VCPA
the
Although
government.
local
and
and (7) state
have
typically
members
board
expertise,
by
clearly define what is meant
respective
their
in
training
a combination of academic and practical
areas.51 Each is appointed by the President of the United States, in
consultation with the New Mexico congressional delegation, to
52
As
staggered four-year terms that overlap presidential elections.
envisioned, the VCT represents a wide array of interests and has
considerable leeway to develop and implement management policy on
the VCNP.
The primary mission of the VCT is to see to the ecological wellbeing of the preserve, protect cultural and religious sites, provide for the
public interest, provide for sustainable resource extraction, maintain the
preserve as a "working ranch," provide for public recreation, and strive
3
for financial self-sufficiency. 5 The VCPA places the VCT in a unique
position to test whether or not it is even feasible to balance these

46. Valles Caldera Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 698v (2000).
47. VALLES CALDERA TRUST, supra note 6, at 39-40.
48. The two permanent federal representatives are the Superintendent of Bandelier
National Monument and the Supervisor of the Santa Fe National Forest. Valles Caldera
Preservation Act, § 698v-2(c).
49. Id. § 698v-5(a).
50. Id.
51. The background information and educational attainment of each board member is
given in the 2003 fiscal year report. VALLES CALDERA TRUST, FISCAL YEAR 2003
CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL REPORT 9-10 (2004).

52. Valles Caldera Preservation Act, § 698v-2(c). As argued elsewhere, the concept of
staggered appointments, "eliminates the possibility that a president would immediately
appoint a new set of trustees." ANDERSON & FRETWELL, supra note 5, at 1, 7.
53. Valles Caldera Preservation Act, § 698v-6(d).
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requirements. Each component of the mandate is equally important;
trustees may not pursue one objective at the expense of another. 54
Provisions for the termination of the trust, should the board fail,
are also given in the VCPA. A report recommending the extension or
termination of the trust must be submitted to the Secretary of
Agriculture during the "eighteenth full fiscal year from the date of
acquisition." 55 In the eventuality of the Trust being terminated, the
VCNP will convert to federal control and become part of the Santa Fe
National Forest. 56
Public accountability is attained through a variety of means. The
VCT must hold public meetings at least three times per year. 57 Any
change in policy that pertains to land and resource management on the
VCNP must be done at the public meeting. 58 The VCT must also provide
an opportunity for the public to comment and give input regarding the
management of the preserve. 59 Transparency is also ensured through the
application of federal environmental and National Forest System (NFS)
statutes. 60 However, the VCT has been exempted from the Forest and
Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA) of 1974 and the
administrative appeal process of the Secretary of Agriculture. 61 The
legislative requirements of the RPA require the Forest Service to develop
resource supply and cost-benefit analyses every five years. 62 The
administrative appeals exemption removes the Trust from the
jurisdiction of the USDA National Appeals Division (NAD). Although
administrative appeals are unavailable, individuals may still pursue
legal action against the Trust.63
Management policy must continuously be tested, assessed, and
adjusted to satisfy long-range goals. The VCT is using "science based
adaptive management" to collect the information needed to formulate

54.

VALLES CALDERA TRUST, supra note 6, at 45-49.

55. Valles Caldera Preservation Act, § 698v-8(b).
56. Id. § 698v-8(c).
57. Id. § 698v-5(g).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 698v-6(f). For example, in 2001 the VCT began developing the procedures
needed to fulfill the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000); the process was completed in 2003. See Valles Caldera Trust,
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Procedures of the Valles Caldera Trust for the
Valles Caldera National Preserve, 68 Fed. Reg. 42,460-72 (July 17, 2003).
61. Valles Caldera Preservation Act, § 698v-6(f).
62. LooMis, supra note 3, at 44-46.
63. Valles Caldera Preservation Act, § 698v-4(j).
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balanced and effective policy. 64 Adaptive management should not be
limited to the physical aspects of the VCNP mission but to the social
dimensions as well. 6 5 Controlled experimentation, and outcome
assessment, is a critical component of any adaptive management regime.
In this regard, the VCT must endeavor to develop a systematic and fully
integrated physical and social science research program. An argument
can be made that early research efforts relating to the VCNP have
focused on the physical science aspects (e.g., assessing what is66 there);
these include a wide variety of donated and hired investigations.
To date, although there are a variety of program planning
67
efforts, there is no systematic social science research program in place.
This is not to argue that the Trust and its professional staff are not aware
of the need to develop these programs. For example, the current Draft
Management Framework recognizes the need to implement visitor
to subject all actions
monitoring and, with respect to economic analyses,
68
evaluation."
economic
"rigorous
to
of the Trust
Of all the provisions found in the VCPA, the goal of financial
69
self-sufficiency is, perhaps, the most distinctive and least understood.
While ecological preservation and conservation require access rationing
to offset human impacts, financial self-sufficiency necessitates access
rationing to generate revenues. Establishing an access fee structure that
70
In this context, the term
is "reasonable" is a complicated task.
reasonable has multiple meanings. From the standpoint of equity,
reasonable is taken to mean setting fees at levels not prohibitive to the
public and, especially, the economically less fortunate. Alternatively,
reasonable is taken to mean establishing fees at levels that allow the

64. Adaptive management is based on the use of on-site scientific analysis to gather
data (and information) that can be used to improve the quality of management decisions.
VALLES CALDERA TRUST, supra note 6, at 58-59.

65. Id. at 129-31.
66. For a review of such efforts, see id. at 61.
67. Such research needs will become increasingly necessary as access programs are
implemented and visitor use increases. For example, there is a need to randomly and
programmatically sample participants (and online applicants) to collect expenditure (on
site and in the region) and other basic socioeconomic information, as well as more detailed
information on attitudes and preferences. Select, limited (1-2 page) surveys of small
numbers of anglers and hikers have been collected to date by the VCT. Rather than serving
as tools in a rigorous economic analysis, the surveys represent one example of how the
Trust has given the public an opportunity to comment. The VCNP staff provided copies of
the paper survey responses; descriptive statistics have been calculated and are available
upon request.
68. VALLES CALDERA TRUST, supra note 6, at 48.
69. Valles Caldera Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 698v-6(d) (2000).
70. Id. § 698v-6(c).
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board to recoup operating costs. 71 But clearly, the financial purpose of
the Trust is not profit maximization; rather it is a kind of balanced
revenue generation program that optimizes income. To be clear, the
VCPA only states that the trust is to strive for financial self-sufficiency; it
is not necessarily a hard constraint. 72 There is the expectation that some
programs (e.g., trophy hunting) would be expected to subsidize other
public access opportunities on the VCNP. Public response and
acceptance to access fees can be expected to vary by activity. For
example, there is a general sentiment that public objection to fees on
public lands has been strongest with respect to non-consumptive
activities such as wilderness-type hiking. In addition to elk hunting,
there are a variety of access fee programs for recreation on the VCNP
that have been implemented. 73
Being subject to the financial self-sufficiency goal and further
requiring some programs capable of generating sufficient revenues to

71. For example, for fiscal year 2003, the VCT reported expenses of $3.4 million and
revenues of $759,186, excluding a $3.1 million congressional appropriation. The recreation
program provided $516,994 or 68% of preserve revenues. But this probably understates the
case for outdoor recreation as a future source of revenue generation at the site. The total
revenues include $200,000 from a timber harvest sale (also involving the Jemez Pueblo) that
was negotiated prior to the creation of the VCNP. On the cost side, the total of $3.4 million
can apparently be attributed to facilities development, with personnel and operating costs
in approximately the range of $1.2 to $1.5 million. The elk-hunting program had operating
costs of $200,000. Notably, a carefully managed grazing program on the VCNP had net
losses of approximately $15,000. VALLES CALDERA TRUST, supra note 51, at 50-51.
72. Valles Caldera Preservation Act, § 698v-4(e).
73. Total recreation visitation at the VCNP for 2003 was 5217. Besides elk hunting, the
VCT has also developed initial recreational programs for hiking, fishing, birding, van and
wagon tours, snowshoeing, and cross-country skiing (to name a few). The Trust also runs
additional public outreach programs that are offered free of charge. For recreational
program information, go to www.vallescaldera.gov/recreation.html. To date, no attempt
has been made in these programs at efficient pricing or to effectively ration by the use of
pricing mechanisms. In most cases, limited access slots are rationed by sign-up (first-come,
first-served or web-based). By way of example, the 2003 per-day fees for fishing were $20
for adults, $16 for seniors and $10 for children (65+ and 5+ years, respectively). Excluding
two free hikes, fees are $10 for adults and $5 for children. Tour fees range from $10 to $30.
To provide comparison, a 2001 meta-analysis generated statistical estimates from a large
number of valuation studies for the average consumer surplus (CS) values for a
recreational visitor day (RVD). Mean predicted CS per RVDs for the intermountain region
(in 2004 dollars) were $36.15 for hiking, $43.62 for fishing, $29.88 for cross-country skiing,
and $36.15 for wildlife viewing. See ROSENBERGER & LOOMIS, supra note 20, at 22. It appears
that (1) there are significant CS or non-market benefits that are being generated and (2)
there is significant room for revenue capture from the VCT recreational program, if
desired, relative to even general CS value estimates. Further, prior studies have tended to
indicate that outdoor recreationists are often relatively price insensitive (inelastic), which
suggests that fee increases could generate additional revenue. See LOOMIS, supra note 13, at
295-304.
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cross-subsidize other programs and access opportunities positions the
Trust against some competitive forces and regulatory constraints not
explicitly outlined in the VCPA. While some may think of the Trust as
having unfettered management discretion (even monopoly power), the
reality is that the VCT does not design and implement policy in a
vacuum. Besides the requirements of the VCPA, the Trust must also
contend with state regulations and both private and public competitors.
For example, the VCT is a new entrant into a fully functional market for
high-valued trophy hunting in New Mexico. 74 Nowhere are the
regulatory constraints and competitive forces more apparent than for the
VCNP elk-hunting program. In the next section, we use the elk-hunting
program to illustrate the context in which the broader recreation
program at the VCNP functions.
IV. THE VCNP ELK HUNT PROGRAM: SUCCESS AND
UNEXPECTED DIFFICULTY 75
The VCNP elk-hunting program began operation in the spring of
2002. Permits were allocated to individuals through both an auction and
a lottery. Aside from introductory and highly limited van and hiking
tours that started in 2001, the VCNP mature bull hunt programs were the
first significant recreational programs developed and implemented by
the Trust. There are three components to the program: a mature bull
permit auction, a mature bull permit lottery, and a state-run lottery of
cow and antlerless elk. Although the cow and antlerless elk hunts
generate revenues for the Trust, the allocation of hunt permits is
determined by the New Mexico Department of Fish and Game
74. There are two important legal considerations to this market: Geer v. Connecticut, 16
U.S. 519 (1896), and the Sikes Act, 16 U.S.C. § 670a-o (2000). First, Geer v. Connecticut
confirmed State ownership of wild game and fish. Second, the Sikes Act allows the Forest
Service (and other federal agencies) to enter into cooperative arrangements with State game
management agencies to charge habitat preservation fees to individuals participating in
state-run hunts taking place on federal lands. Under this arrangement, the State benefits
from both its ownership of game resources and its ability to use federal land for its hunting
programs, while the federal government typically receives only minimal recompense. In
New Mexico, a state hunting permit on a game unit involving USFS or BLM lands requires
purchase of a $5 Habitat Preservation Stamp. N.M. DEIYT OF GAME & FISH, BIG GAME AND
FURBEARER RULES AND INFORMATION: 2004-2005 LICENSE YEAR 11 (2004), available at http://

www.wildlife.state.nm.us/publications/index.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2005). Thus, the
state regulates hunting and fishing of game species, and these activities already occur on
state, federal, and private lands.
75. The following uses lottery ticket sales data that have been provided by the Trust
and then combined with 2000 Census and other data by the authors. All data are available
upon request from the lead author. A more complete data description is provided in
Appendix A.
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(NMDFG) lottery system. 76 It is the mature bull auction and lottery
combination that provides a unique insight into how the VCT has
addressed the policy issues associated with the financial self-sufficiency
requirement. More importantly, the design, operation, and evolution of
the VCNP mature bull auction and lottery combination presents
implications that will affect the design of other recreation programs on
the preserve. We consider two aspects of the auction-lottery system,
revenue generation and equity.
The mature bull auction and lottery combination is meant to
generate revenues for the trust and satisfy the public access mandate of
the VCPA. A stylized display of individual values, or maximum
willingness to pay (WTP), for a mature bull elk permit on the VCNP is
provided in Figure 1. The demarcation (A*) represents the number of
permits that will be auctioned off, with all other permits subject to
lottery allocation. As a program choice, A* could be assumed to
represent an equity constrained, income maximizing combination of
auction and lottery permits. 77 Successful auction bid values are
represented left of A*. As long as the auction is incentive compatible,
maximum WTP is expressed through bid value. To the right of A* are the
remaining individual values for participants in the lottery. Although
lottery participants value hunting access, their WTP is not high enough
for them to successfully bid for a permit through the auction. For these
individuals, the lottery is their only means to obtain a permit. In the
presence of uncertainty, however, this WTP is only partially revealed
through the ticket purchase. P* represents the lottery ticket price, which
does not guarantee a permit but only the chance at being drawn. P* is
also a program choice variable and has been set at $25 since the
program's inception. The auction maximizes revenues through perfect
price discrimination, while the lottery allows for the capture of some

76. NMDGF lottery ticket sales data for the cow and antlerless hunts on the VCNP are,
at this time, unavailable. These hunts generated between $100,000-$110,000 per year. This
calculation was made by subtraction of the 2003 mature bull auction and lottery revenues
from the $429,525 of reported elk hunt receipts. VALLES CALDERA TRUST, supra note 51, at
50-51.
77. For theoretical insights into the determination of A and how resource managers
can use some simple "rules of thumb" to identify income maximizing auction-lottery
permit combinations, see Mary Evans & Nicholas Flores, Relative Economic Efficiency and
the Provision of Rationed Goods 12-16 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
www.colorado.edu/Economics/CEA/papersOl/wpOl-3/wp01-3.pdf (last visited Mar. 12,
2005). The VCNP elk permit auction provides an excellent opportunity to apply this
methodology. However, the auctioning agencies (i.e., Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation,
Safari Club International, and Cabelas) did not retain much of the information needed to
make such a calculation.

Winter 2005]

UNCHARTED TERRITORY

portion of individual WTP (through ticket purchase) and promotes
public access.
Based on the ability to perfectly price discriminate, the permit
auction is a pure revenue generator where equity is not a consideration.
In both 2002 and 2003, the Trust allowed five permits to be placed up for
auction. 78 Except for one permit that was sold on eBay, the VCT did not
conduct the auctions. Organizations such as Safari Club International
(SCI), the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation (RMEF), and Cabelas sold the
permits on the Trust's behalf. Based on a predetermined percentage in
each case, auction proceeds were split between the VCT and the
respective organizations. Figure 2 presents the auction proceeds and
their split for the ten permits that were sold in 2002-2003.
The mean winning bid was $13,200 for the 2002 auction. Total
revenues were $66,000, of which the trust received 71% or $47,100. For
2003, the mean winning bid was $13,500 and total revenues were $67,500,
of which the trust received 67% ($45,500). It is important to note that in
2002 the single permit that was sold on eBay generated revenue of
$12,000, which exceeded the Trust's per permit share of $9420 for that
year. 79
Over a two-year period, the auction generated revenues of
$92,600 for ten permits. The substantial bid values seen in the auction
point toward the potential magnitude of individual willingness to pay.
Although the auctions produced considerable revenues, they do not
address the public access and equity components of the VCT mandate.
The lottery, on the other hand, is meant to fulfill the Trust's
obligation to provide fair and equitable access to the elk hunting
program. 80 This is not to say that the lottery component of the elk
hunting program disregards revenue generation. In 2002, ticket revenue
from the elk-hunting lottery was $336,000 and $255,000 in 2003. No other
recreation program at the VCNP currently generates near that amount of
82
revenue. 81,
78. Table 1A in Appendix A presents a breakdown of winning auction bids by
auctioning foundation.
79. The decision to not conduct the auction itself reflects a promotional cost the Trust
was willing to incur to foster interest in the VCNP. Telephone Interview with Richard
Engstrom, Business Director, VCNP (May 19, 2004).
80.

VALLES CALDERA TRUST, VALLES CALDERA HUNTING DESCRIPTION, at http://www.

vallescaldera.gov/comevisit/elk/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
81. By comparison, the VCT reported recreation fee revenues of $60,550 for FY 2003.
VALLES CALDERA TRUST, supra note 51, at 50-51 (2004).
82. Although open to debate, the significant decrease between the 2002 and 2003 ticket
revenues, despite the increasing awareness of program existence, may likely be attributed
to a combination of factors. First, and probably most important, 85 mature bull permits
were allocated across five different hunts through the lottery in 2002, while 48 permits
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Similar to state-run hunt lotteries, the VCNP lottery gives the
public an opportunity to purchase a positive probability of obtaining a
permit at a reasonable cost. Also, like state programs, the VCNP lottery
is used to alleviate the excess demand that occurs when access quantities
(permits) are fixed and prices are lower than would prevail in the
market. A distinct feature common to more traditional state-run hunt
lotteries is that access is rationed equitably, that is, independent of
income. In the traditional state lottery model (e.g., as in New Mexico),
participants choose from a set of hunt sites and dates and are allowed a
single application for each of their choices. 83 Under this format, each
individual has an equal probability of winning with the chance of being
drawn determined by the total number of applicants in the pool and the
number of permits allocated. More complicated systems may employ
preference points to achieve various policy objectives such as benefiting
state residents or encouraging repeat participation. 84 Although
preference point systems alter the win probability so that it is not
uniformly distributed, the change is not due to individual income.
State hunt lotteries satisfy the public interest by providing a
reasonable (and equitable) opportunity to individuals. In doing so,
however, there is an incentive to manage for herd quantity rather than
quality. 85 An example of such management would include basing the
were allocated across four hunts for 2003. The Trust chose to decrease the number of
permits in 2003 based on input from hunters who felt that "over harvesting" would
negatively impact the quality of the elk herd. Information pertaining to the perception of
potential "over harvesting" was obtained via telephone interview with Steve Mauer, Public
Lands Information Association (PLIA) (May 26, 2004). The second change was the
suspension of permit transferability in 2003. Permits issued through the 2002 lottery were
fully transferable and a speculative market formed. A number of the 2002 lottery winners
resold their permits to outfitters, guides, and others on the secondary market for a profit.
Ironically, the Trust found that, when auctioning a permit on eBay, they were doing so
along side many of the 2002 winners. The suspension of transferability in 2003 was a
response to this speculation. Information regarding the suspension of transferability was
obtained via telephone interview with Rich Engstrom, Business Director, VCNP (May 19,
2004). The authors reason that this change potentially reduced ticket demand by reducing
the value of the lottery permit to some participants such as outfitters. It should also be
noted that, despite ending transferability, no apparent attempt was made by the Trust to
capture any additional program revenues itself (e.g., by increasing A* or raising P*, which
remained at 5 and $25, respectively).
83. Dave Scrogin & Robert P. Berrens, Rationed Access and Welfare: The Case of Public
Resource Lotteries, 79 LAND ECON. 137, 137 (2003); David Scrogin et al., Policy Changes and the
Demandfor Lottery-Rationed Big Game Hunting Licenses, 25 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCEs ECON. 501,
502 (2000). Please note that hunters are not restricted to only participating in a single year.
84. David E. Buschena et al., Valuing Non-Marketed Goods: The Case of Elk Permit
Lotteries, 41 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 33, 34 (2001).
85. John T. Wenders, The Economics of Elk Management, in WILDLIFE IN THE
MARKETPLACE 89, 89 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1995).
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number of permits on a maximum sustainable yield. 86 The fact that the
public has perceived a decline in elk hunting quality in recent years
87
exemplifies the problems associated with such management practices.
The 2002-2003 VCNP lottery differed considerably from more
traditional designs. Access coupons (tickets) cost $25 and there was no
cap on the number that could be purchased. This gave partcipants
additional chances at being drawn. Individuals selected from a small set
of hunts that varied by weapon type and date.88 If drawn, an individual
had to remit an access fee of $175 to enter the VCNP. For safety
purposes, winners were required to attend a one-day orientation. Given
that many individuals are unfamiliar with the VCNP, the Trust has
certified a number of guides and outfitters whose services could be
purchased by lottery winners. 89 Finally, winners were allowed to bring a
friend hunting with them. 90
The VCNP lottery exhibits the revenue-generating characteristics
common to a raffle. Because individuals can purchase more than one
ticket, the probability of winning is a function of the number of tickets
purchased and is not uniformly distributed across participants. For large
numbers, this relationship is approximated by:91

Aj
j=1

[1]

:j

Where 0i is the win probability for individual i, qij is the quantity of
tickets purchased by individual i for hunt j, Qj is the total number of
tickets purchased for hunt j, and Aj is the total number of elk permits
issued through hunt j. For traditional lotteries, qij would be capped at
one and the win probability for a specific hunt uniformly distributed
across entrants. In the VCNP lottery, qij is a choice variable that is
dependent on the entrant's individual preferences.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 91.
Id. at 92-93.
In 2002, there were five hunts: one archery hunt, one muzzleloader hunt, and three

rifle hunts. For 2003, there were four hunts: one archery, one muzzleloader, and two rifle

hunts.
89. Once certified, an outfitter must remit $300 and pay $50 per guide to the VCT.
Telephone Interview with Dave Phillips, Staff Member, VCNP (May 27, 2004).
90. VALLES CALDERA TRUST, ELK HuNT PRoGRAM RULEs, available at http://www.
vallescaldera.gov/comevisit/elk/elk-needtoknow.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
91. A total of 10,206 tickets were sold for the 2003 VCNP elk hunt lottery (see Table 2A,
Appendix A). The permit draws are done without replacement. Thus, the size of the ticket
pool for each hunt will change as a winner's tickets are withdrawn prior to subsequent
draws. Given the large number of tickets that were sold for each hunt, the formula
provided in [1] gives a reasonable approximation of the win probability and is used to ease
analysis.
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Raffles are often used to raise funds for a variety of good causes
92
such as school programs, hospital programs, and medical research.
Hunt raffles are also commonly used to raise funds for private hunting
clubs and there are examples of state agencies marketing hunt raffles as a
way of raising funds for habitat preservation. The allure of the raffle is
that participants realize two benefits: a potential return on their ticket
purchase in the form of a fixed prize and the benefit of the raffle revenue
93
being used to provide a public good (e.g., habitat preservation).
Revenues generated from raffles have been shown to dominate other
public good provision mechanisms under certain circumstances. 94 While
the prize provides an enticement to participate, it is not uncommon for
the expected value of participation to be less than individual ticket
expenditures and, in the extreme, negative. Economists typically employ
an expected utility framework and judgments about risk to assess
individual behavior with respect to risky choices. Such an approach can
identify expected utility maximizing raffle expenditures even in what
appears to be an unfair gamble. 95 There are a variety of plausible
explanations for the fact that the expected value of participation in raffles
is often less than expenditures: some participants may be incorrectly
assessing win probabilities, some may be risk seeking, or participants
may have sources of utility other than the fixed prize such as the benefit
of supporting the provision of a public good.
There is considerable theoretical discussion and provision of
examples of what are called the donation and dream components of
raffle participation. 96 Although difficult to quantify, these components of
individual value contribute significantly to the revenue generating
capabilities of a raffle. An individual's satisfaction or utility derived from
contemplating what they would do if they won represents the dream
92. Brian Duncan, Pumpkin Pies and Public Goods: The Raffle Fundraising Strategy, 111
PUB. CHOICE 49, 49 (2002); see also Kerry Fehr-Snyder & Susie Steckner, Barrow's Deluxe
Raffle Not Risk-Free, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 31, 2003.
93. Duncan, supra note 92, at 50.
94. Douglas D. Davis et al., Raising Revenues for Charity: Auctions Versus Lotteries 3
(Oct. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://gunston.gmu.edu/bwilson3/
papers/drrwl003.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005)); Duncan, supra note 92, at 49.
95. In this circumstance, the purchase of an additional ticket not only increases the win
probability but also lowers the marginal price of contribution (in expectation). Thus, an
individual's expected utility may increase but the expected value of participation may
remain small (or negative). As noted by Duncan, "A quick assessment of the probability of
winning compared with the estimated value of the prize reveals the truth about raffles:
they are generally very unfair gambles." Duncan, supra note 92, at 49.
96. Loyd R. Cohen, The Lure of the Lottery, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 712-17 (2001);
Ian Walker, Lotteries: The Determinantsof Ticket Sales and the Optimal Payout Rate, 13 ECON.
POL'Y 357, 360-63 (1998); Davis et al., supra note 94, at 22.
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component of individual value and a source of motivation for
participating (or the level of expenditures). 97 An individual may also
derive utility from donating to a good cause through the purchase of a
ticket. For the VCNP lottery (raffle), ticket purchases may be motivated
in part by the financial contribution the lottery revenue makes to the
98
VCNP.
To illustrate this point, we assume risk neutrality and that the
donation and dream components of participating in the VCNP lottery
(raffle) are zero. Under these circumstances, the expected participation
value (EPV) for an individual in the VCNP lottery (raffle) is calculated
under a wide variety of plausible parameter assumptions. The formula
is:
EPV = 0j(,8* -TCY.-P*q. -Li)-(1-0i)(P*qj )
[2]
Where P3*is the personal hunt value for individual i, P* represents the
ticket price, qij represents the quantity of tickets purchased by individual
i, TCi represents the travel cost, and Li represents relevant license fees. 99
Using the observed 2003 average permit value of $5300, mean estimated
travel cost, mean win probability (1%) from the 2002 (prior) season as a
proxy for the subjective probability, mean ticket expenditure, and
relevant license fees, the expected participation value was -$18.96 for
non-residents and -$3.71 for residents. 100 When broken down by winners
and non-winners, the expected participation value (EPV) is -$146.46 and
-$11.21, respectively. The negative values exemplify what is meant by an
"unfair gamble." To clarify, negative values can be associated with a
number of factors including the small probability of winning, increased
travel costs, ticket expenditures, and out-of-state license fees. While it is
possible to drive EPV to be greater than average ticket expenditures if
we assume hunt values significantly greater than those actually observed
in the permit auctions, under a wide range of assumptions for combined
parameter values the results are negative (or close to zero). This is not

97. Cohen, supra note 96.
98. Walker, supra note 96, at 363.
99. Individual travel costs were calculated following a common formula. See Kalyan
Chakraborty & John E. Keith, Estimating the Recreation Demand and Economic Value of
Mountain Biking in Moab, Utah: An Application of Count Data Models, 43 J. ENVTL. PLANNING
& MGMT. 461, 463 (2000). Instead of the $0.25 per mile cost used by these authors, an
updated value of $0.35 was used. Round-trip travel distances (in miles) were compiled
using the PC miler program and are measured as the distance between the "home" zip
code and the VCNP.
100. Current, standard, mature bull license fees are $69 for residents and $481 for nonresidents. Applicants must also remit a $5 habitat preservation fee with their application.
N.M. DEP'T OF GAME & FISH, supra note 74.
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uncommon in raffles and perhaps no other result better illustrates their
ability to generate funds for public good provision.
In summary, analysis of the first two years of the combined
auction and lottery elk hunt permit allocation program demonstrates
significant capacity for revenue generation. Revenues were more than
sufficient to cover the permit program costs and subsidize other
programs at the VCNP. The Trust has developed a program with the
potential to generate substantial operational funds and with the
opportunity to further expand revenue using the auction lottery
combination. This is not to argue that there are not ways to increase
revenues from the mature bull elk permit program.101 Given that the
lottery did not impose a strict one ticket per person format, the equity
performance of the elk hunt lottery remains an empirical question.
Equity has traditionally been viewed from the standpoint of
economic status. In this context, fair access to the VCNP would imply
that the fee structure would allow a wide array of individuals from
differing economic backgrounds to participate in a variety of recreational
programs. As stated previously, the auction does not satisfy this
condition, leaving the lottery as the primary mechanism for equitable
access. With regard to the lottery, two different approaches were taken to
analyze the equity component. First, Gini coefficients measuring the
distribution of income across different subsets of 2003 ticket buyers were
calculated. Second, a set of ticket demand functions was estimated to
identify the effect of household income on ticket sales. The VCNP staff
provided the 2003 lottery ticket data set used in the analysis. The data
included the number of tickets purchased per transaction, the name of
the buyer, the hunt(s) (by weapon type) chosen, the date of the hunt, and
10 2
contact information that included a zip code.
Gini coefficients can be used to measure the dispersion of
income across the sample. Values closer to zero indicate that household
income is evenly distributed across groups, while values close to one

101. Such opportunities include (1) optimal auction design for incentive-compatible
revelation of maximum WTP, (2) determining the optimal combination or split (A*)
between the number of permits to auction and the number to make available to the lottery
(raffle), (3) improving the percentage of surplus captured by the Trust itself on auctioned
permits, and (4) determining a revenue-maximizing price for the lottery tickets.
102. Once again the authors would like to thank the VCNP staff for providing the
lottery ticket data set. It should be noted that each transaction was given an order
identification number (order ID) when the purchase was made. The order ID provided the
clearest means through which ticket transactions could be tracked. More detailed
explanations of the data are found in appendix A at the end of this article. A critique of
basing these models on aggregate data is provided in Klaus Moeltner, Addressing
Aggregation Bias in Zonal Recreation Models, 45 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 128, 131-32 (2003).
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indicate otherwise. Using the 2003 lottery data, the Gini coefficient for
the entire sample is 0.183, which suggests that household income is fairly
evenly distributed on the whole. When broken down by residency, the
Gini coefficient for non-residents is 0.184 and 0.165 for New Mexico
residents. This suggests that household income is reasonably distributed
among these sub-samples. If broken down by permit winners, the Gini
coefficient is 0.201 for successful participants and 0.182 for non-winners,
once again indicating that household income is reasonably distributed
across winners and non-winners. The comparable mean household
incomes of the winners ($58,000) and non-winners ($57,500) further
supports this finding. The calculated Gini coefficients provide a first
insight but do not directly measure the role that household income is
playing in the ticket purchase decision.
Using data on 2003 VCNP elk hunt lottery ticket transactions,
raffle ticket demand functions were estimated to identify the impact that
household income and other determinants have on ticket purchase
transactions. Conceptually, the individual demand function is:
q=f(M, E(tv), Sub, Permits,SD,R)

[3]

Where q is the quantity of tickets purchased (dependent variable); M is
household income; E(tv) is the expected ticket value, which (using 2002
objective probabilities) is a proxy for the level of expected net-benefits to
a ticket given travel costs and relevant fees; 103 Sub is an indicator for
substitute hunting opportunities; Permit is an index of available permits
to a given weapon type (e.g., archery, muzzleloader, rifle, or various
combinations); 10 4 SD is a vector of socio-demographic characteristics;
and R is an indicator of residency status (i.e., New Mexico resident or
nonresident). Note that we do not directly include ticket price (P*), since
it has been fixed to date at $25. However P* does enter indirectly through
E(tv). Given the truncated, count data nature of the ticket purchases, a
zero truncated negative binomial log-likelihood was maximized and is
105
given by:

103. For an example of a ticket demand function for a pari-mutuel lottery that uses
expected ticket value as an explanatory variable, see Walker, supra note 96.
104. Alternatively, we can simply use a set of hunt-type indicator variables.
105. The maximum likelihood function presented in [4] derives from A. Colin Cameron
& Pravin K. Trivedi, Econometric Models Based on Count Data: Comparisons and Applications of
Some Estimators and Tests, 1 J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 29, 30-33 (1986). The transactions
data are truncated because there is no probability of observing a "zero" ticket purchase.
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Where a represents an over dispersion parameter accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity and ki is defined as the mean ticket demand
(E(q)) and is equal to ex'f where X' is the vector of explanatory variables.
Explanatory variables include (1) E(tv), the expected value of a ticket; (2)
HHINC, the average scaled household income of participant i's zip code
tabulation area (ZCTA); (3) PERMIT-INDEX, a permit hunt index; (4)
DNM, a New Mexico resident dummy variable; (5) PHE, the average
private hunt expenditures for the state in which individual i resides and
represents the substitute good; (6) PERURB, the average percentage of
individuals in participant i's ZCTA that resides in urban areas; (7)
PERHSPLUS, the average percentage of individuals in participant i's
ZCTA with at least a high school diploma (or GED); (8) AVGHHSIZE,
the average household size for participant i's ZCTA; (9) TENURE, the
average percentage of homeownership in i's ZCTA,;(10) DMUZZ, a
muzzleloader hunt dummy variable; and (11) DARCH, the archery hunt
dummy variable. 10 6 Descriptive statistics are broken down by residency
and by winner/non-winner in Table 1.
Four alternative specifications of the model were estimated and
are shown in Table 2. The first model includes the permit index variable
and excludes the vector of socio-demographic characteristics. The second
includes both the permit index variable and socio-demographic
characteristics. The third employs hunt dummy variables for archery and
muzzleloader hunting and excludes the socio-demographic variables.
The fourth uses the archery and muzzleloader dummy variables and
includes the socio-demographic characteristics. As Table 2 indicates,
each model is significant (0.05 level) overall and the negative binomial
format is appropriate given the significant X2 test for over-dispersion. It
should also be noted that estimation results are robust across each
specification.
Since the ticket price does not vary, the estimated functions are
not demand equations per se but rather functions representative of

106. More detailed explanations of the data and variables used in the analysis are found
in Appendix A at the end of this article. See Moeltner, supra note 102, for a critique of
basing such analyses on aggregate level data.
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demand shifts. 10 7 The coefficient on HHINC when evaluated at the mean
household income is interpreted as income elasticity. Given the
limitation of observations at only one price, we are not able to evaluate
the critical issue of price elasticity of demand for lottery tickets or
whether price increases would raise or lower program revenues.
Across the four models, there are no differences in sign or
significance level of the estimated coefficients for the variables common
to all four models. In particular, the estimated coefficients on the income
variable (HHINC) are of importance if program equity is to be
addressed. The estimated coefficient on income is small but significant
(0.10 level) for all four models, which suggests that participants with
higher incomes did buy more tickets but the effect is not strong. This fact
is made more readily apparent when the calculated income elasticities
are used to identify the change in ticket expenditure that would occur
should household income increase. Income elasticities can be estimated
at the mean scaled household income for all four models. The elasticities
range from 0.17 for the reduced model with permits to 0.25 for the
expanded model with hunt dummies, which indicates that VCNP lottery
tickets are viewed as a normal good. More succinctly, the elasticities
suggest that a $575 increase in household income would result in an 11to 18-cent increase in ticket expenditures.10 8 If measured in terms of the
2003 observed probability for the mean ticket purchase, an 18-cent
increase in expenditures would change the win probability by 0.002.
Given these results, it appears that household income is not a dominant
factor in the ticket purchase decision and, hence, the probability of
winning access. When taken in conjunction with the calculated Gini
coefficients, the findings suggest that, in terms of initial performance, the

107. Along with the reliance on aggregate (zip code level) socioeconomic data, the lack
of price variation (P*) is reflective of the need for the VCT to broaden the scope of its data
collection and analysis program. Specifically, contingent behavior surveys can be used to
investigate demand responsiveness to proposed changes in fee levels or other lottery
program design issues. For further discussion, see Robert P. Berrens & Richard M. Adams,
Applying Contingent Valuation in the Design of Fee Hunting Programs: Pheasant Hunting in
Oregon Revisited, 3 HUM. DIMENSIONS WILDLIFE 3, 11-25 (1998); Jeffery Englin & Trudy A.
Cameron, Augmenting Travel Cost Models with Contingent Behavior Data: Poisson Regression
Analysis with Individual Panel Data, 7 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 133, 133-47 (1996). For a
recent contingent behavior application to proposed increases in fishing license fees, see
DANIEL W. MCCOLLUM ET AL., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. FOREST SERVICE, A SURVEY OF 1997
COLORADO ANGLERS AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PAY INCREASED LICENSE FEES (1999). Such
analyses are entirely consistent with the adaptive management concept, where the use of
surveys would allow the Trust to examine important social dimensions (attitudes,
preferences, and values) and form testable hypotheses prior to enacting policy changes.
108. Figures are based on the mean household income of $57,500, mean ticket expenditure of $72.75 and mean permit index of 15.81.
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VCNP lottery is not inherently favored toward participants with higher
incomes.
The average state private hunting expenditures variable (PHE)
was included to gauge the magnitude of substitutability or
complementarity between private land and VCNP hunts. Average
private hunt expenditures were shown to have a positive and highly
significant (0.01 level) impact on the ticket purchase decision in all four
models. This result suggests participants view private hunting in their
home state as a substitute to the VCNP lottery.
Finally, state residency is shown to have a strong, negative
impact on the ticket purchase decision for all four models. This result
suggests that New Mexico residents purchase significantly fewer tickets
than do non-residents. 109 The fact that New Mexico residents purchase
significantly fewer tickets and are, hence, winning fewer permits raises
potential policy concerns. These concerns are amplified when one
considers that the fugitive elk resources that are on the VCNP are owned
by the state. These concerns are also consistent with the recent
unexpected regulatory actions taken by the State of New Mexico.
The State as Resource Manager and Competitor
For the 2004-2005 season, New Mexico Department of Game and
Fish (NMDGF) will allocate 30,000 elk permits across 325 different hunts
spread over 56 hunting units through the lottery system. Individuals are
only allowed a single application per hunt choice and rank up to four
sites on which they would like to hunt. Weapon types and license
categorization differentiate hunts. The four license categories are (1)
standard (S), (2) quality (Q), (3) high demand (HD), and (4) quality/high
demand (Q/HD).nO License fees vary by category and state-residency.
New Mexico residents pay a fee of $46 for S, Q and Q/HD
antlerless/either sex hunts and $69 for S, Q, and Q/HD mature bull
hunts. Non-residents pay $291 for standard antlerless hunts, $481 for
standard mature bull or either sex hunts, and $766 for Q, HD, and Q/HD
mature bull, antlerless, and either sex hunts. Thus, in summary, the
109. By way of comparison, the mean ticket transaction for New Mexico residents is
2.78 and 3.01 for non-residents. A t-test of means showed that the difference was significant
at the 0.05 level.
110. The high demand designation is applied to hunting units where at least 20% of the
applications come from out-of-state residents for at least two previous license years. The
quality designation is given to a hunting unit at the discretion of the New Mexico Game
and Fish Commission and is used to distinguish those units with a greater selection of
mature deer and elk, lower hunter densities, and preferred dates. This information can be
found in N.M. DEP'T OF GAME & FisH, supra note 74.
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NMDGF is able to price differentiate in its elk permit lottery by
residency status and hunt quality. The VCNP lottery is in the standard
license category.
The VCT may have the right to ration public access to the VCNP
but is limited in its ability to manage the game species that exist on the
preserve."' At the request of State Senator William Payne (R-District 20,
Bernalillo), the New Mexico Attorney General (NMAG) recently issued
112
The
an opinion on the legality of the Trust's mature bull lottery.
opinion stated that the VCNP mature bull lottery was in direct violation
of a 1997 state law requiring that 78% of the elk permits issued through
113
public draw be given to New Mexico residents.
Besides the imposition of the resident quota, the VCNP elk hunt
program was also impacted by a re-designation of the VCNP by the
incoming New Mexico Game and Fish Commission (NMGFC). Prior to
2004, mature bull permits granted to the VCNP were essentially treated
the same as the permits issued to private landowners. This designation
allowed the Trust to allocate the permits at their own discretion. The
incoming NMGFC re-designated the VCNP as a federal land unit, which
effectively brought the mature bull elk program under the purview of
the NMDGF. With the new federal designation, the Trust is no longer
114
allowed to allocate state-owned wildlife resources through its auction.
While the full basis for the suspension of the VCNP auction
program is unclear, the revenue potential of a high-quality elk herd has
become increasingly apparent to wildlife managers nationwide. 15 Highvalue auctions for bighorn sheep, mountain goat, moose, and elk have
produced much needed revenues for game and fish agencies in many
western states (e.g., Oregon, Washington, and New Mexico). The revenue
interest at stake in the allocation of fugitive resource rights is no small
111. Valles Caldera Preservation Act § 105(f), 16 U.S.C. § 698 (2000). The inclusion of
this provision relates directly to the federal government's recognition of state primacy in
wildlife management.
112. 03 Op. Att'y Gen. 06 (2003).
113. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-3-16 (Michie 2001).
114. Telephone Interview with Dennis Trujillo, Preserve Manager, VCNP (June 22,
2004).
115. State game managers are using raffles and auctions to generate revenues for
program operations. For example, the State of Oregon runs a variety of big-game raffle
programs. Further, in one of the longest-running auctions, the Oregon Department of Fish
and Wildlife has auctioned one Big Horn Sheep permit per year since 1987. Between 1987
and 2003 the program has generated revenues of approximately $987,000, which averages
out to $57,941 per permit. OR. DEP'T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, BIGHORN SHEEP AND ROCKY
MOUNTAIN GOAT MANAGEMENT PLAN 39 (2003). The State of New Mexico also auctions
Bighorn Sheep licenses for the purpose of habitat restoration. N.M. DEP'T OF GAME & FISH,

supra note 74.
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matter to NMDGF. In the winter of 2004, a single mature bull permit
netted $90,000 for the department. 1 6 These funds are to be primarily
used for habitat conservation and hunter education within New Mexico.
Thus, in effect, the VCNP auction allowed a federal body to benefit from
11 7
a state owned resource.
Private Land Competitors: Or "You Cannot Expect to Buy a Western
Ranch and Pay for It with Income from Cows" 1h'
Evidence, over the last decade, from a national survey suggests
hunting participation and expenditures have been relatively flat or
declining nationwide, with the apparent exception of big-game hunting.
During this time, hunting participation and expenditures have been
growing in New Mexico for big-game hunting. Between 1996 and 2001,
there was a 25% increase in hunting days spent on private lands in New
Mexico. 1 9 Total hunt expenditures rose 58% in New Mexico over the
same time period. 120 Currently, 39% of all hunting in New Mexico takes
place on private land.' 2 ' This evidence is consistent with statistical
market evidence for the rising value of private trophy hunt ranches in
New Mexico, especially relative to traditional livestock operations. 122
While the VCT definition of a working ranch is rather broad, it is clear
that a large (e.g., greater than 10,000 acre), sustainable, working ranch in

116. Telephone Interview with Christy Bosworth, Director of Foundation Programs,
Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation (RMEF) (May 25, 2004); see also Associated Press Wire
Serv.. Michigan Hunter Pays $90,000 for N.M. Elk Hunting License (Mar. 21, 2004). The
winning bidder has the right to hunt anywhere in the State of New Mexico between
September and December of 2004.
117. The authors speculate that the NMDFG may have viewed the VCNP auction as
setting a precedent for other federal agencies to request permits for auction purposes. In
this context, such precedent could potentially undermine pre-existing agreements
pertaining to state game management and hunt access on federal land.
118. A recent hedonic pricing analysis of New Mexico ranch sales prices is provided by
L. Allen Torrell et al., New Faces and the Changing Value of Rangeland 1 (Oct. 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Natural Resources Journal).
119. PALLAB MOZUMDER Er AL., PAC. N.W. RESEARCH STATION, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.
FOREST SERV., & UNIV. OF N.M. DEP'T OF ECON., LEASE AND FEE HUNTING ON PRIVATE
LANDS IN THE U.S.: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF THE ISSUES, WITH ANNOTATED

BIBLIOGRAPHY 74 (2004). The data analyzed therein is drawn from U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING HUNTING AND WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED RECREATION

(FHWAR) (1991, 1996, 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/
fishing.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Torrell et al., supra note 118, at 19.
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any high-mountain area of New Mexico (i.e., comparable in location and
123
scale to the VCNP) is best characterized as a big game trophy ranch.
The expanding market for private ranch hunting in the state has
fundamentally shifted the value basis of ranch prices from livestock
production to recreation. The addition of a single bull elk permit to a
private ranch can increase the value of rangeland from $28,300 to
$127,000 per acre.1 24 When capitalized, the real land appreciation rates of
1 25
private hunt ranches run between 5% and 7% per annum on average.
Hunting, not livestock production, is the single most important factor
driving ranch prices in the State of New Mexico. 126 This is especially true
for high mountain ranches with elk habitat. 127
Consistent with the economic development gains associated
with private land hunting, NMDGF has taken steps over the last decade
to foster the growth of private land hunting through the Land-owner
Sign-up System (LOSS) programs. LOSS allows landowners to register
with the state and acquire the hunt authorizations needed for the
provision of antelope or elk hunting on private land. Once granted, the
authorizations can be allocated at the owner's discretion. In many cases,
outfitters and guides purchase and then resell the authorizations to
willing buyers. It is not until the final buyer approaches the state with
the authorization, pays the appropriate licensing fee, and acquires the
128
necessary permit that transferability is suspended.
LOSS has aided greatly in increasing the availability of private
land hunting in the state of New Mexico. In 2003, a total of 18,646
authorizations for elk permits were issued, 10,304 of which were
converted to non-transferable permits. 129 Non-residents converted 52
percent of LOSS authorized permits; New Mexico residents converted

123. As any quick Internet web-search will show, there are dozens of such ranches
advertising high-quality, guided elk hunts in New Mexico. By way of example, for the 2004
hunting season, a private-landowner, mature bull elk tag for a fully guided rifle hunt at the
Lodge at Chama (near Chama, New Mexico) cost $8000. See RATES & RESERVATIONS FOR
THE LODGE AT CHAMA, at www.lodgeatchama.com/home.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
Additionally, the proprietors of Northern New Mexico Elk Hunts were offering a private
landowner mature bull tag, room, board, and guide services for $5500 at an undisclosed
at
ELK HUNTS,
See NORTHERN NEW MEXICO
Mexico.
in New
ranch
www.elkhunts.cc/prices/prices.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
124. Torrell et al., supra note 118, at 19.
125. Id. at 28.
126. Id. at 1-2, 19-20.
127. Id. at 19.
128. Telephone Interview with Ruth Anderson, Manager, Land-Owner Sign-up System
for Elk and Antelope (June 9, 2004).
129. N.M. DEP'T OF GAME & FISH, AUTHORIZATIONS BY UNIT (2000-2003) (unpublished).
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the remaining 48 percent. 130 Between 20 to 25 percent of authorized
permits were for mature bull elk. 131 LOSS authorizations are not
allocated through public draw and are exempt from the resident quota.
This provides both residents and non-residents an opportunity to avoid
the uncertainty associated with the NMDGF lottery system. The program
significantly reduces the legal barriers to entry, which, subsequently,
increases the number of hunt ranches operating in the state. LOSS serves
to foster rural economic development by allowing ranchers to diversify
their income sources with private recreational hunting. 132 LOSS also
promotes economic development by creating forward economic linkages
between authorized ranchers, outfitters, and guides. 133 The LOSS
program provides the foundation for private ranch hunting in New
Mexico.
The final participants in the New Mexico elk hunting market are
the tribes and pueblos. For example, the Mescalero, Zuni, Jicarilla, and
Navajo tribes all offer mature bull and cow elk hunts on their lands.
Given their status as sovereign nations, NMDGF has no regulatory
authority over tribal hunts. In most cases, tribal elk permits are issued
through a lottery similar to the state's format. However, the tribes also
offer a variety of market allocated hunts, with some permits going for
$9500.134

The VCT, the State, and the Ranches: An Identified Market Structure
A monopolistically competitive market is one where firms
compete primarily through quality differentiation for similar goods. It is
monopolistic because substantial barriers such as high-fixed or set-up
costs may limit entry into the market, and, to the extent that they can
quality differentiate their product, producers may have price setting
power so that price exceeds marginal cost and economic profits are
positive. It is competitive because the number of suppliers will increase
if existing firms are earning a positive economic profit. Once economic
profit has been dissipated, entry ceases. At that point there may be either
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Anderson, supra note 128.
133. Id. Recall that LOSS authorizations are given directly to certified ranchers, who
allocate the permits to whomever they choose. This process frequently involves outfitters
and guides, who resell the permits to private individuals on the secondary market. Id.
134. There are a variety of hunts available; the $9500 value is for an elk-hunting package
on the Mescalero reservation. For a brief description of some of the tribal hunts, see N.M.
OUTDOOR SPORTs GUIDE, HUNTING BY REGION, at http://www.nmosg.com/Hunting/

visited Mar. 21, 2005).

(last
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a small or relatively large number of firms competing in the market.
Monopolistically competitive firms commonly use various price
discrimination strategies in an attempt to expand market share and
capture revenue. The key to the monopolistically competitive firm's
price setting power is the residual consumer demand they face and their
ability to hold onto or add to this demand by quality differentiating their
product (and preventing re-sale). The market for elk hunting in New
Mexico exhibits many of the characteristics common to monopolistic
competition.
Within this context, prior to the 2004 hunting season, the VCT
offered high quality hunts (through auction and lottery) at its own
discretion. Hunt quality is a significant contributor to consumer
willingness to pay; as such, the access restrictions imposed by the
auction-lottery serve to preserve the quality of the hunt site and elk
herd. 135 Preservation of the hunt site and elk herd may induce
individuals to submit a larger auction bid or purchase more lottery
tickets and, in turn, increase revenues. Since private ranches and tribal
entities also offer elk hunting in New Mexico, the VCNP elk program is
only one of the options available for hunters to pursue. The revenues
generated by the VCNP elk hunt program are not only affected by the
residual hunt demand, but also by the NMDGF resident quota and
private hunt ranches. By offering their own high quality/high success
hunts, private and tribal competitors impact VCNP elk revenues by
drawing potential auction and lottery participants away from the
preserve. The VCT entered this market as the only federal entity that is
an active participant.
A number of potential revenue and equity impacts emanate
from the recent State decisions. After eliminating the auction, the
resident quota effectively forces anyone wanting to hunt on the VCNP to
participate in the lottery. Although income was not shown to have a
substantial impact on the ticket purchase decision, the inclusion of high
value auction participants into the lottery may result in a more
inequitable allocation of permits. Also, the uncertainty associated with
the purchase of a lottery ticket may induce individuals who purchased a
permit through the auction to forgo the VCNP lottery and, instead,
choose to pursue state or private hunt options. The quota also forces the
Trust to allocate the majority of permits to the subset of lottery
participants that display a considerably lower ticket demand for the
VCNP hunt (New Mexico residents). While it may take time for both
residents and non-residents to respond to these new conditions, it is
135.

Davis, supra note 85, at 114-15.
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likely that the 78% quota contributed to the significant decrease in ticket
revenues (down 21% from $255,000 to $201,450) for the 2004 lottery. This
decrease in revenue was realized despite the increase in available
permits from 2003 (from 48 to 75).136
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: WHERE DOES THE VCT
STAND?
Critics of the charter forest and trust concepts argue that they are
simply a smoke screen and represent a step along a devolution agenda to
eventual privatization of as much of the public domain as possible. A
primary concern with any privatization proposal is the failure to
guarantee adequate protection for relatively large, pristine landscapes
and wildlands. However, the more optimistic view of the charter forest
and trust concepts is that they offer a balance between privatization and
more traditional, centralized (federal) command and control arrangements. Such a view is offered by Daniel Kemmis, who states:
Almost always there is someone invoking capital N
national command and control and someone else just
saying no to any form of control, and in the middle of it all
is an increasingly compelling recourse to what almost no
one is yet ready to recognize as the early stages of an
emergent form of sovereignty. 137
But as the economic and policy analysis presented here makes clear, the
sovereignty wielded by charter forests and trusts will not come without
constraints; will not be resolved without cooperative arrangements with
local, state, and federal agencies; and will need to evolve based on
adaptive management principles.
Much has been made of the Trust's apparent autonomy and
tabula rasa for creating environmentally and economically sustainable
programs within the confines of its charter. 138 To their credit, in the first
few years the Trust implemented a successful auction and lottery (raffle)
combination that generated significant net revenues and appeared to
allocate hunt access in a reasonably equitable fashion. However, recent
decisions by the State of New Mexico may have severely constrained the
136. Telephone Interview with Steve Mauer, Operations Manager, Public Lands
Information Association (May 26, 2004).
137. Kemmis, supra note 4, at 17-18.
138. The Trust describes itself as "unconstrained by standard methods of the Forest
Service.. .a new kind of administrative structure, freestanding, entrepreneurial and
innovative in its approach." VALLES CALDERA TRUST, supra note 6, at 44.
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latitude of the Trust in the operation of its largest revenue generating
activity.
With respect to the elk hunts, the Trust now finds itself in a
disadvantaged position. It can no longer use the auction to price
discriminate and capture revenue from high-valued bidders. The Trust is
also constrained by the New Mexico resident quota in how they draw
raffle winners. The State of New Mexico is certainly aware of the
opportunity to capture revenues with auctions of big-game trophy
hunting. Further, private trophy ranches in New Mexico are relatively
numerous and do not face the same constraints as the Trust. Thus, the
trophy-hunting situation may be best seen through the lens of
monopolistic competition. As such, the Trust can attempt to qualitydifferentiate its access opportunities and compete for high-valued
bidders for trophy hunts with the State of New Mexico and the private
trophy ranchers.
Many arguments in support of the trust concept emphasize the
flexibility to innovate and adjust on the ground. Consistent with such a
view, the VCT has several avenues of response. First, it might argue for
re-instatement of the auction. If the state and private parties can
implement first-degree price discrimination in some limited context, then
139
it is unclear why the Trust would be legally prevented from doing so.
Second, it might attempt to generate substantial revenue from the raffle
program by implementing an alternative raffle format. For example, it
could implement second-degree price discrimination in the raffle where
individual participants pay an entry fee and then a fixed-price per raffle
ticket. More basically, there appears to be no constraint on the Trust from
significantly changing the price (currently $25) on raffle tickets. At this
point there is no understanding of the price elasticity of demand for the
raffle tickets, but typically many outdoor recreation opportunities are
relatively price inelastic and price increases can provide additional
revenue; this issue can be assessed through contingent behavior surveys.
Third, the Trust can look to bundling its permits with other services,
capitalizing on its unique location, topography, and program stature to
help quality-differentiate its trophy hunting opportunities.
Importantly, the Trust can build on its experience with the elk
hunts to significantly expand revenue generation from other outdoor
recreation programs (e.g., cross-country skiing, wagon tours, fishing,
hiking, mountain biking, etc.). To date, the Trust has adopted a go-slow
approach, introducing limited access programs and minimal fees. Pricing
139. Given that the 78 percent quota and the auction ruling/interpretation are primarily
legal matters, any resolution of the conflict may require a political solution (i.e., exemption
or reclassification of VCNP within the context of the Sikes Act, etc.).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

and packaging policies (auctions, raffles, two-part tariffs, bundling, etc.)
available for big game hunting are also relevant to these other recreation
programs. In addition, these other programs are not subject to the same
state regulatory controls that have emerged unexpectedly for the case of
allocating the elk hunt permits. The Trust has already adapted to the
excess demand in 2003 for the fixed-fee, first-come, first-served (web
sign-up) fishing program by allocating angling access in 2004 via a
lottery (raffle). This policy change exemplifies the Trust's flexibility and
ability to learn and quickly adapt to conditions "on the ground."
Such discussion of attempts to actively pursue revenue
generation is not to argue that the Trust should pursue programs that
somehow open the turnstiles and compromise or degrade the ecological
integrity of this remarkable landscape. Rather, consistent with early
articulations of program visions, the Trust can provide a range of highquality experiences. But doing so will require restricting access both
temporally across the year and spatially across the landscape, and this
will further require allocation rules.40 Some significant components of
those allocations can be done through known revenue-generating
mechanisms. It is also possible to pursue equity considerations by
ensuring that some components of access allocation are accomplished
through non-priced mechanisms (true lotteries; first-come, first-served,
special assignments for youth and volunteers; etc.).
As 2017 approaches, should the Trust have been unable to
develop programs that in combination fully satisfy financial selfsufficiency, there is likely to be increasing pressure to measure and
identify the regional economic impacts (i.e., market effects on
employment and income) and the non-market consumer surplus benefits
(i.e., to the broad spectrum of visitors to programs that are not price
rationed) generated by the VCNP. It would seem critical to begin to
collect and assess the necessary economic data. As noted before, the
financial sustainability objective is not a hard constraint and eventually
there will be a need for public and congressional judgments about how
well the Trust has pursued its mandated objectives, and whether or not
the charter should be extended. This article argues that this judgment
must be done with a clear view of the regulatory and competitive
constraints that the Trust confronts.
It is exactly this attempt at balancing that must play out over the
next dozen years on the VCNP that makes the charter forest experiment
140. In addition to revenue generation, pricing policies can also be used in aiding the
dispersion of visitors across time and the landscape (e.g., through peak-load pricing and
differential site or trail pricing). In this way, pricing can be actively used to protect resource
quality and visitation experiences. See Loomis, supranote 13, at 295-301.
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so intriguing. As charter forests and trust concepts are discussed for
implementation elsewhere, advocates of alternative institutional
arrangements for managing wildlands and natural environments will
undoubtedly be keeping a close eye on the VCNP. Staking out a middle
ground between privatizing the public domain and reliance on federal
control is clearly uncharted territory. If nothing else, such attempts
deserve to be given a fair chance.
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Figure 1: A Stylized Array of Individual Values for VCNP Auctior/Lottery
Combination.

Number of Auctioned
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Figure 2:2002-2003 Elk Hunt Permit VCNP Auction (Winning Bids)
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for 2003 Elk Hunt Lottery
VARIABLE

EXPENDITURE
TICKETS
E(tv)
DISTANCE
PERMIT-INDEX
PERURB
AVGHHSIZE
HHINC
TENURE
PERHSPLUS
PHE
DMUZZ
DARCH
OBSERVATIONS

Total
Mean
(S.D.)
73.424
(95.356)
2.937
(3.814)
6.808
(5.097)
829.56
(647.532)
15.811
(7.424)
0.675
(0.346)
2.677
(0.314)
57.5
21.195
0.736
(0.124)
0.834
(0.095)
96.203
(65.350)
0.112
(0.282)
0.193
(0.375)
3475

Residents

Winners

---

NonResidents
---

69.553
(83.446)
2.782
(3.338)
12.969
(0.467)
144.336
(98.169)
15.603
(7.117)
0.725
(0.343)
2.651
(0.304)
51.39
(15.96)
0.740
(0.106
0.820
(0.103)
109
(0)
0.114
(0.283)
0.179
(0.366)
1198

75.461
(101.021)
3.018
(4.041)
3.567
(3.009)
1190.078
(507.699)
15.92
(7.576)
0.648
(0.344)
2.690
(0.318)
60.72
(22.84)
0.734
(0.132)
0.842
(0.090)
89.470
(79.919)
0.113
(0.281)
0.206
(0.383)
2277

241.41
(298.781)
9.656
(11.951)
6.597
(5.156)
840.456
(625.618)
19.25
(9.039)
0.704
(0.335)
2.694
(0.288)
58.0
(24.634)
0.738
(0.126)
0.821
(0.119)
82.75
(49.484)
0.113
(0.250)
0.387
(0.448)
48

---

NonWinner
--70.273
(84.113)
2.812
(3.365)
6.812
(5.097)
829,366
(648.023)
15.74
(7.376)
0.674
(0.346)
2.676
(0.314)
57.49
(21.13)
0.736
(0.124)
0.835
(0.095)
96.456
(65.59)
0.112
(0.282)
0.197
(0.377)
3427
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Table 2: Estimation Results for Ticket Demand Functions
(Truncated Negative Binomial)
Reduced
Expanded
Reduced
Model
Model
Model
w/ Hunt
w/ Permits
w/Permits
Dummies
Variables

Expanded
Model
w/ Hunt
Dummies

E(tv)

0.014
(1.05)

0.016
(1.21)

0.019
(1.29)

0.022
(1.45)

HHINC

0.0029
(1.75)*

0.0038
(1.66)*

0.0034
(1.78)*

0.0044
(1.65)*

PHE

0.0021
(4.00)*

0.0022
(4.11)-

0.0023
(3.72)-

0.0024
(3.77)***

DNM

-0.296
(2.18)**

-0.323
(2.32)**

-0.314
(2.09)**

-0.333
(2.17)**

PERMITINDEX

0.063
(13.11)-

0.063
(13.11)*

AVGHHSIZE

-0.074
(0.65)

-0.074
(0.59)

PERURB

0.014
(0.13)

-0.074
(0.60)

PERHSPLUS

-0.390
(0.91)

-0.242
(0.50)

TENURE

0.214
(0.66)

0.097
(0.27)

DARCH

0.566
(5.85)-

0.566
(5.82)*

DMUZZ

0.374
(2.74)***

0.374
(2.74)***

-2.618
(2.06)*
71.14"
5420.64***
3475

-2.284
(1.72)*
69.515414.14"**
3475

CONSTANT
X 2 (Model)

X2(a)
OBS.

-1.938
(6.74)**
251.46*
4967.99-*
3475

-1.640
(3.10)"
252.53*
4963.48***
3475

Notes: Numbers are estimated coefficients; numbers in parentheses are z-statistics;
- indicates significant at 0.01 level; - indicates significant at 0.05 level.; * indicates
significant at 0.10 level.
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APPENDIX A: DATA CATALOGUE AND DESCRIPTION
The VCT and its staff generously provided the VCNP elk hunt
data presented in this article. The data sets that were provided by the
Trust include (1) 2002-2003 elk hunt lottery ticket data, (2) 2002-2003 elk
hunt auction data, and (3) 2002-2003 elk hunt lottery winners lists. The
elk hunt lottery data contains the names, contact information,
expenditures, and ticket quantities purchased by hunt type for program
participants. Observations are recorded by an individual order ID
number. The lottery data also include the number of mature bull permits
allocated through each hunt type. The explanatory variable PERMITINDEX is an index created by summing the hunt permits for which the
individual can be drawn. 141 To maintain consistency, a total of 21 foreign
participant observations were dropped from the lottery data. 142
The 2002-2003 elk hunt lottery winners check-in list provides the
contact information and hunt type for each lottery winner. This
information was merged with the lottery data so that descriptive
statistics could be calculated for the sub-sample.
The 2002-2003 auction lottery data provides only the name of
the organization that auctioned the permit and the winning bid amount.
Although auction winners are identified on the check-in list, there is no
way to match these individuals to their bid amounts. The Rocky
Mountain Elk Foundation (RMEF) auctioned two permits in 2002 and
one permit in 2003.143 Safari Club International (SCI) auctioned two
permits in 2002.144 The VCT auctioned one permit on eBay in 2002.
Cabelas auctioned four permits in 2003.145
The Trust does not collect micro-level socio demographic data
from program participants. Examples of socio-demographic data that
could be collected and utilized by the VCT when designing recreational
programs include gender, age, race/ethnicity, educational status,
141. For example, if an individual had purchased tickets for the archery and
muzzleloader hunts, their permit index would equal 20 since there were 12 permits issued
for the archery hunt and eight for the muzzleloader hunt. Basically, the individual's ticket
choice gives them 20 chances at being drawn for a permit.
142. This was done because of the difficulties associated with obtaining sociodemographic data from their home nation's census.
143. The RMEF auctioned one permit each at the 2002 and 2003 national conventions.
One permit was auctioned at a regional convention in 2002. Telephone Interview with
Christy Bosworth, Director, Foundation Operations, RMEF (May 25, 2004).
144. SCI auctioned one permit at the 2002 SCI national convention; the other was
auctioned at a regional convention. Telephone Interview with Ed Beardsely, Director of
Operations, SCI (May 24, 2004).
145. Cabelas auctioned a total of four permits in 2003; no information on individual bid
values is available. Telephone calls to the organization are, as of yet, unreturned.
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hunting experience, family size, and personal income. Given that this
data is unavailable, the analysis presented relies on aggregate data
146
drawn from the 2000 U.S. census zip code tabulation areas (ZCTA).
Aggregate data that were collected include (1) population in urban and
14
rural locales, 147 (2) aggregate household income (in 1999 dollars), 8 (3)
150
149
tenure of housing units (owner/renter), (4) number of households,
1 1
and (6) total popula(5) educational attainment (25+ years of age),
152
The census data was then used to construct the vector of
tion.
explanatory variables used in the analysis. These variables are (1)
15 3
(2) PERHSPLUS (percentage
AVGHHSIZE (average household size),
degree or better), 1 4 (3)
school
high
a
with
years
25+
of the population
55
(4)
PERURB (percentage of population living in an urban area),
156
(5)
and
occupied),
owner
is
that
TENURE (percentage of housing
157
income).
household
HHINC (scaled average
In the interest of identifying potential substitution effects,
average private hunt expenditures (PHE) on a state-by-state basis were
compiled. Where unavailable, a mean value of $93.64 was entered for
58
that state.

146. This was possible because elk hunt lottery participants are required to include their
zip code in their contact information. The use of aggregate level data introduces the
possibility of aggregation bias influencing the econometric analysis. For a description of the
problem and possible solutions, see Moeltner, supranote 102, at 131-32. Aggregation bias is
especially a problem when dealing with socio-demographic variables such as race and
gender. For this reason, census data on the average race/ethnic/gender composition of the
ZCTA was not included in the analysis.
147.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES SUMMARY FILE 3, tbl. P5,
-

=

at http://www.factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTGeoSearchByRelationshipServlet? ts 12
9028108270 (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
148. Id. tbl. P54.
149. Id. tbl. H7.
150. Id. tbl. H16.
151. Id. tbl. P37.
152. Id. tbl. P1.
153. Calculated as total ZCTA population divided by number of households.
154. Calculated as total ZCTA population (25+ years) with a high school degree or
better divided by total ZCTA population (25+ years).
155. Calculated as the number of individuals in ZCTA reported to be living in an urban
area divided by total ZCTA population.
156. Calculated as ZCTA owner occupied housing units divided by ZCTA total number
of housing units.
157. Calculated as ZCTA aggregate household income divided by ZCTA total number
of households. This value was then scaled by dividing by 1000 to ease analysis; thus, a
value of $57.5 should be read as $57,500.
158. Average private hunt expenditure data was taken directly from table 2.8 of
MOZUMDER ET AL., supra note 119, at 29. The $93.64 represents the mean value of the private
hunt expenditure data presented in the report.
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The 2002-2003 auction data is presented in table 1A. This table
includes the name of the auctioning foundation and the winning bid. The
2002-2003 lottery permit breakdown, by hunt, is provided in table 2A.
Also included in this table is the number of tickets purchased and
expenditures for each hunt.
Table 1A: 2002-2003 Auction Bids and Revenues Accrued by VCT
Organization
Bid
Net to VCNP
VCT Share
2002
RMEF-National

15,000

9,000

60%

RMEF-Regional

12,000

7,200

60%

SCI-National

15,000

10,500

70%

SCI-Regional

12,000

8,400

70%

eBay

12,000

12,000

100%

50,000

35,000

70%

RMEF-National

17,500

10,500

60%

Total

133,500

92,500

70%

2003
Cabelas
permits)

(four
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Table 2A: 2002-2003 VCNP Lottery Ticket Sales, Revenues, and Permits
Hunt Date

Hunt

Tickets Sold

Revenue

Permits

2002
Muzzleloader

Oct. 26-30

1,330

33,250

10

Archery

Sept. 10-20

3,276

81,900

20

Rifle B

Oct. 5-9

2,765

69,125

15

Rifle C

Oct. 12-16

3,494

87,350

20

Rifle D

Oct. 19-23

2,579

64,475

20

Total

---

13,444

336,100

85

Muzzleloader

Oct. 18-22

1201

30,025

8

Archery

Sept 9-18

2453

61,325

16

Rifle 1

Oct. 4-8

4293

107,325

12

Rifle 2

Oct 11-15

2259

56,475

12

10.206
10.206

255,150

48

2003

Tntal

Ttal

